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Clinical Sociology in the Service of Social
Change: The Experience of Developing
Worker Management
C. George Benello1
Hampshire College

In this article I will discuss my experiences over the last six years in working to develop democratically organized, self-managed businesses, and
describe what I learned in the process. Self-management refers to an organizational system in which working members both own and control their own
business, using a democratic method involving one worker-one vote. My experiences span two organizations, the first a national organization which I
shall call the National Self-Management Organization (NSMO), the second a
regional organization which I shall call the Regional Self-Management
Organization (RSMO).
At various times in my life, in addition to being a teacher of sociology, I
have worked in adult education, community organizing and community
development, business, research, and as an administrator-organizer in the
peace movement. But I have never worked in an area where the need to embody theoretical understandings in organizational practice was so pronounced.
The two organizations, NSMO and RSMO, were both set up to provide
technical assistance to workers wishing to develop self-managed businesses.
Those of us involved in these organizations learned about self-management
both by trying to help workers develop it and by attempting to apply it within
our own organizations. Most of us came from professional, and particularly
academic, backgrounds. As professionals, we had been for the most part
trained to work alone, not in close conjunction with others or in teams. We all
espoused the ideal of economic democracy and were eager to implement it, but
often our personal styles became a major impediment. We learned that if we
were to work effectively with others, we had to learn to become an effective
working group. Out of this came our collective recognition of the intimate link
between theory and practice.
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In this paper I will describe the theoretical considerations which led me to
choose this area as well as some of the things I learned and some of the things
the organizations I worked with learned. Most of our work together was uncharted territory; we needed to develop an adequate model of what we sought
to achieve, and also learn how to realize that model in practice. We felt it
essential that whatever we developed be capable of serving as a model of the
scale and technology which characterizes mainstream business practice in this
country. Our goals were bold but they were dictated by the desire to be relevant. In my previous work in social change organizations I had learned two
things: that the initial vision of goals was all-important; if they were defined
too narrowly, it was difficult later to try to broaden them. Secondly, I had
learned that it took little if any greater effort to organize a large organization
than a small one; the same elements were needed in both cases, and the larger
scale often attracted capable people who would not be drawn to a more
modest effort.
Accordingly, my first objective was to organize a national organization
which could create a self-managed sector in the American economy, capable
of demonstrating the viability of democratic organization in industry - the
area where the performance demands placed on organizations are probably
greater than any other. Initially the vehicle for this effort, the NSMO, was to
be a chapter-based organization with a central staff. Ultimately, we hoped,
chapters would develop their own staff. As we shall see, the initial efforts were
a failure; the national organization set up to develop worker management
ceased to exist without ever having experienced success. But the experience and
the skills learned did not disappear; nor did the commitment to continue. Out
of the initial failure came at least three organizations which are continuing the
work with at least partial success, and in a couple of instances, more. A critical
divide has been crossed; where in the beginning we had little sense of the
strategies, techniques and skills needed to accomplish our purposes, we have in
at least one of the offshoots of the NSMO collected a team with the financial,
legal, organizational and educational skills needed to successfully develop
worker-managed companies.

ORGANIZATIONAL BEGINNINGS: THEORY AND STRATEGY

My interest in worker-management dated from my affiliation with an institute in Montreal where I was first a Fellow, then a Board Member and finally President. One project was to set up a worker-managed factory for about
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fifty workers in the community surrounding the institute. The experiment failed, partly because of French-English tensions and partly because the low skill
level of the workers made it difficult to find contracts. But it taught me
something about worker motivation and especially about how hard it was to
give workers a sense of ownership and involvement in a project which had
been organized for them by others and then handed over. Motivation, 1 came
to see, was critical.
In due time 1 moved to Ithaca and came to know Jaroslav Vanek, an
economist who is one of the major theorists of worker management in this
country. He had ideas about why the traditional cooperatives had failed and
some solutions. He believed that to implement worker management within the
essentially alien environment of the corporate system it was necessary to have a
"supporting corporation" capable of giving educational, financial and
technical support to worker-managed companies. A supporting corporation
could provide capital on a loan basis without the strings that equity investment
entailed. It could help develop a network of worker-managed companies to offer reinforcement and mutual support to each other. It could provide continuing assistance and advice. I began to see how some of the traditional problems
which had plagued cooperatives — their isolation and their need to be selffinancing, with consequent distortions in their system of control — could be
avoided.
On a more theoretical level, I had believed for some time that, given the
nature of American culture and society, the development of significant
organizational alternatives could be a force for change. In part this belief is
derived from an interpretation of the sociology of knowledge, derived from
Berger and Luckman (1967) and Boulding (1956), which recognizes that the
arbitrary character of social institutions is concealed from view because their
origins in acts of social construction is lost. The systemic character of social
reality, involving the reinforcement of social character and social institutions
(Allport, 1961; Fromm and Maccoby, 1970) determines and limits the perception of alternative possibilities, and gives a spurious sense of necessity to the
existing institutional system. But I also believed that while this holds true for
contemporary industrial society, it is not universally true. A society in which
the intercourse between subjectivity - human desires -- and objectivity — their
institutionalization -- was continuous and interactive would give people the experience that social institutions are relative human constructs and can be
changed.
A society such as ours is characterized by an extensive technologicalindustrial apparatus, unintelligible to most, and embodying an enormous
commitment of human and material resources. With little shared knowledge
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and control, this creates a sense of powerlessness and inevitability. An equally
extensive propaganda apparatus defines progress as technological advance,
and sees this as both cumulative and inevitable. While the immediate goal of
the propaganda apparatus is the selling of the standard consumer package
which defines the American Way, it also devotes a good part of its energy to
selling the system as a whole (Etzioni, 1972). In it, the organizational and
technological means and the objective -- the material benefits of the American
Way — are seen as systemically interlinked. However, the apparent
seamlessness of the system has been unravelling; an increasing effort is needed
to sell not simply the products, but the system itself (Etzioni, 1972).
The American system impacts on its members on two levels. The official
definitions stress democracy and participation in the political sphere, while
relegating the economy to the "private" sector, which is supposedly ruled by
the invisible hand of the market. As Habermas (1975) points out, to the extent
the invisible hand is failing to work, requiring intervention on the part of the
government, the economic system has become politicized. The assumption of
automatic adjustment is now dying and in its place we have Naderism and loss
of faith in the structural foundations of the system. At a deeper and more problematic level, the competitiveness and individualism which have characterized
the system are now being questioned (Lodge, 1975), resulting in a withdrawal
into privatism and a rejection of the dominant institutional forms in favor of
craftsmanship, small collectives and cooperatives and other variants of New
Age culture (Case and Taylor, 1979). Although the mainstream has become
disaffected, as yet there is only the beginning of an alternative vision. The New
Age culture is too exotic to permit widespread acceptance as a viable alternative. But a movement for economic democracy can appeal to the majority,
since it appeals to the populist distrust of Big Business and Big Government
which is now stronger than it ever has been.
The strategy of developing a self-managed sector would speak both to
material needs and to the desire for self-determination and restoration of control to the local level. It would create jobs that were secure from the dangers of
runaway plants and the whims of conglomerate management. It would
guarantee to communities that their efforts to start such businesses and to accommodate them would be repaid by a steady flow of income. Selfmanagement represents a new form of legitimation more in consonance with
the strivings for participation and equality which characterized the sixties
(Benello, 1975). On the one hand, people remain hopeless in the face of the
vastness and power of the corporate system, and the extent to which government and administrative bureaucracies affect every aspect of life. On the other
hand, the frictional costs and inefficiencies of the system are increasingly apparent. This creates the opportunity for alternatives so long as these alter-
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natives can prove their viability in terms of capacity to meet productive
demands and utilize the existing technology.
A further characteristic of such alternatives is that they be on a scale
capable of challenging mainstream organizations. Also, although the nature
and uses of existing technology are being questioned, the idea of a high
technology is broadly accepted; organizational alternatives must demonstrate
their ability to employ a complex production system and a high technology.
Such alternatives must be humanized and democratic in structure but not Utopian in the sense of demanding heroic measures of their members, such as
rejection of private property, total equalization of income or a zero-profit
orientation. Although these latter features characterize some of the work collectives of the counterculture, they would not appeal to the majority of
workers. The latter would, however, welcome the opportunity to own their
own jobs and would quickly come to recognize the benefits and security that
come from a democratic form of governance.

TACTICAL QUESTIONS, ORGANIZATION ISSUES

By the time I reached Ithaca, 1 had become convinced that both the
negative conditions of delegitimation and the positive heritage of the sixties
had created a condition where it would be possible to engage seriously in the
effort to build worker self-management. Because the major thrust of the
American system is to create increases in productivity and profits through
technological advance, I believed that the industrial system was the place to
start, even though its work force was shrinking in relation to the service and
public sectors. The contradiction between the monotonous and highly
repressive conditions of factory work and the official mythology of
democratic governance make the production system the weak link in terms of
legitimation. Contemporary efforts to legitimate the system are couched in
terms of the need for managerial expertise, but an accumulating body of
evidence shows that efficiency of control, rather than of production, is the real
goal and that such control can actually reduce production efficiency (Braverman, 1975; Gorz, 1976). Michael Maccoby has estimated that up to 40 percent
of managerial overhead is often superfluous.2
Traditionally, efforts to create social change are aimed at organizing the
poor or other dissident groups, or at organizing for protest. Our efforts were
different. The small group of us who got together in Ithaca wanted to develop
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successful operating examples of economic democracy. In practice we did not
want to be an advocacy group as one, the Association for Self-Management,
existed already. We felt that only successful operating models could dispel the
myths and mystification that had become so closely associated with the
technology of production. Also, success in creating enterprises of significant
size could have an important impact on communities, especially if they could
be major employers in the communities.
Because of time considerations and because of our lack of experience in
enterprise development, we decided to concentrate on plant shut-downs and
runaway plants - situations where a viable business had existed but had been
closed down for reasons extrinsic to its basic potential. Plant shut-downs occur irregularly and are dispersed. We therefore needed an organization which
was itself dispersed, with chapters located preferably in industrial areas. The
plan was to develop an organization with chapters that would eventually cover
major centers along the East Coast, and with a governing board made
up of delegates from each chapter as well as from public figures committed to
self-management. The first step was to develop an initial board of Ithacabased members.
As the staff person for the organization, my first job was to put together
the board and, with the help of the other two founding members, obtain tax
exemption and then raise funds. Although 1 had worked for tax exempt
organizations, I had never gone through the application process. This became
my first step in developing a series of needed skills which I did not initially
possess. The board consisted mostly of academics and 1 was the only person
who had fundraising and organizing experience. As a result, there quickly
developed differences in perception as to what was needed for the organization. Some could see no need for national figures which I felt were essential to
obtain grants for an organization in as new a field as this. We needed credibility. Also, as academics (and I include myself here) we all suffered from a lack
of acquaintance with process skills. In our haste to begin working we did not
take the time to work out differences which were later to polarize the organization. In addition, because of a failure to clarify organizational goals, several of
the initial Ithaca members saw the organization as Ithaca-based and oriented
toward assisting small, zero-profit type cooperatives of the sort that had begun
to develop locally.
Later, as more chapters developed and sent delegates to the board, the
thrust toward the development of larger enterprises won out, but the opposition between many of the original Ithaca members and the new majority continued and remained a source of friction. The Ithaca members were suspicious
of foundation fundraising, in part because I was both the fundraiser and a ma-
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jor proponent of working outside of Ithaca to develop larger enterprises. They
advdcated an organizational approach based on voluntarism and unpaid staff,
which fitted in with the idea of developing small cooperatives but contradicted
the goal of developing a professional staff capable of putting together larger
projects. As a partisan in these issues, it is difficult to claim objectivity; both
approaches were viable, but they had different goals.
Plant shut-downs require immediate initiatives if they are to be salvaged
before the work force goes elsewhere and the sales deteriorate. Due to the need
to make rapid decisions, a Steering Committee was set up in Washington to
evaluate and approve projects. and to decide whether to commit staff
resources. The Ithaca members, however, wished to retain control over these
decisions; they insisted on maintaining monthly board meetings and required
that all board members be polled before a project was officially begun. As
more chapters were formed, they developed their own agendas and made their
own demands on central staff resources. Conflicts thus developed over who
should enjoy the scarce resources of staff time and the allocation of any extra
funds after staff and overhead expenses were paid. These conflicts were not
resolved at the board level and as other conflicts accumulated, they eventually
overwhelmed the organization. Thus we found ourselves in the paradoxical
situation of working in an organization dedicated to implementing selfmanagement which seemed, in the end, unable to manage itself.

A CASE STUDY: ONE THAT GOT AWAY

The following example illustrates both the objective problems we had to
try to deal with as well as some of our own organizational problems. This particular effort ended in failure. Today, given the greater expertise, greater access to resources and funding which we now possess, the story would probably
have been different. But it was a noble try. The case involves a bakery in
Boston which was shut down in part because of the opposition of one woman.
She lived across the street from the bakery and devoted most of her time to
litigation in order to force the bakery to control its pollution which involved
flour dust, noise, and exhaust from its many trucks. She prevented the bakery
from installing flour storage bins and, as far as we could tell, was a major factor in the owner's decision to close down. Equally important factors involved the
existence of three competing unions in the bakery, dubious management, and
an absentee owner who seemed interested only in the bottom line.
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The unions were initially suspicious of our suggestion that the workers
buy the bakery. Workers were willing, but one business agent in particular,
seeing his job — bargaining with management — threatened, was outspokenly
opposed. By then we had on our staff an economist who had been the chief
economist for a large conglomerate. He did a quick feasibility study, mostly
by talking to the workers and putting together figures given him by the
manager, who wished to stay on. With the help of a Boston-based organization also interested in worker management, we contacted the city government,
local banks, and a local community development corporation in an effort to
put together a funding package which included a significant amount pledged
by the workers. The owner, probably skeptical of our capacity to come up
with the money, pressed for a commitment and then demanded that we put up
$25,000, non-refundable, for an option. We stalled and tried to firm up commitments from the potential funders. In the meantime, some of the company's
key staff left for other jobs, while buyers began to turn to other sources of supply.
When the Boston chapter of the NSMO heard about the bakery shutdown, they investigated. From initial investigation and talks, to feasibility
study, to calling a meeting of the workers, the process seemed continuous and
rapid. The national staff economist lived in Boston and it was natural to call
on him. But when the Washington-based Steering Committee heard of his involvement, it seemed to them like simply one more example of the refusal of
both staff and chapters to abide by guidelines laid down by the board. By then
a climate of distrust had developed which added to the desire of chapters to be
independent of board constraints and which I, as executive staff person, was
unable to counter. A considerable degree of solidarity had developed within
the Boston chapter and this was furthered by the experience of working
together intensively on the bakery probject. I was caught in the middle of a
crossfire, unable to persuade the Boston group to subject themselves to the
demands of the Steeering Committee, but also deemed partially responsible by
the Steering Committee because of my feeling that the project was a major opportunity for us to transform an organization which employed over 200
workers.
As it turned out, we were unable to convince a city government, which
dragged its feet, to put up the loan guarantees needed to obtain the necessary
bank loans. By then the workers had opened an escrow account and we were
all committed to the idea of a buy out. Distrust on the owner's part was increased by a secret attempt on the manager's part to make an independent offer. Although the proceeds from liquidation were only a fraction of what
could have been obtained from selling the bakery, the owner decided after a
couple of months to proceed with the liquidation, selling the name to a com-
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pany in Connecticut. This company then proceeded to manufacture bread
under the original name, although it had no other connection with the bakery
in Boston. We learned from this experience that without the support of rapidly
obtainable external funding we could not expect to raise the several million
that would be required for buying out any plant of significant size. But we also
learned how to formulate a plan for union involvement in a worker-managed
system and learned that with a business plan and credentials that looked professional, we were at least seriously listened to by banks and the city government. We had strong support in the city government, but also, unfortunately,
oppositon. There was also oppositon within our own organization, however,
and it was this that prevented us from working to develop the sort of external
support that was needed.

THE PROBLEMS OF WORKING ON THE INTERFACE

Working in social change organizations often means learning to make
two presentations of self — one to the change organization members and
another to those outside. In the NSMO, these problems were compounded.
Although there was not the pressure to adopt the radical uniform and style
that exists in some movement circles, there was certainly the need to look and
talk "straight" when approaching foundations, and even more so for banks
and city governments. To achieve credibility we had to look businesslike and
know the vocabulary of business. I was fortunate in having had both business
and fund raising experience; my problem was to convince some of the more
stylistic radicals in the NSMO that I was not really a banker in disguise. In the
case of the staff economist, a refugee from the world of multinationals, the
distrust bred by his essentially middle-class lifestyle — a suburban home, two
cars, and the highest income in the organization — never was dissolved.
Despite his commitment to self-management, his energy and his needed skills,
a number of members never accepted him.
There were many difficulties in working in what can be characterized as
an interface positon, facing on the one hand an envisioned future of organizations with different values and a different structure, and on the other organizations centrally located in the mainstream. There was always the question of
how much to say. In the application for tax exemption written with the occasional help of a local lawyer, I said far too much. I later learned that the IRS
would have been much happier with a minimal pro forma application since
everything I said raised a dozen questions in its turn. The application was buck-
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ed from the regional office to Washington, and only got accepted after a
number of visits and lengthy emendations. I learned to gauge how much to say
with potential donors, and to use a carefully edited language. With most, it
was wiser to speak of job creation benefits, of employee ownership and of selfhelp programs instead of worker management.
Negotiating with "straight" institutions such as banks, small business investment corporations and the local branches of government agencies,
generated tensions some of us had difficulty dealing with. When a bank turned
down our application for a loan, it was easy to interpret this as ideological opposition when often it was simply fiscal conservatism. There was indeed an ingrained distrust of cooperatives as a viable business form on the part of the
Small Business Administration (SBA) and other agencies. In one case this was
dealt with by taking a trip to Washington to speak with one of the state's
Senators, who then put pressure on the SBA. This sort of work had none of
the appeal of mass mobilization and revolutionary rhetoric. It was slow, often
unsuccessful, and involved dealing with a series of bureaucracies which did not
understand what we were trying to do and could not be told.
Working on the interface was often lonely. One had to abandon the sense
of shared community that is available either on a college campus or in an outand-out radical collective which has little need to deal with the "straight"
world. Our own organization, fraught with conflicts as it was, was often of little support. But we gained allies, especially among the workers, after they had
gotten over their initial suspicions. Gaining the confidence of the workers in
the companies with which we worked was critical to our efforts and here our
success gave us heart. Often, we were surprised at how much the workers
seemed to know about their business and at the accuracy of their criticism of
management practices.
Working in an area that was unfamiliar to most of us, we developed skills
for which we had no background. A professor of philosophy became an expert
in poultry processing and its markets; a mathematical economist became adept
at doing projections and writing business plans; our staff economist turned
out to be adept at communicating our ideas to workers, despite his
background in top management. We found that we could deal effectively with
banks, with local governments and with funding agencies. As we developed
the needed expertise we grew more confident that, despite our failures, the
right situation would sooner or later come along and we would experience success.
In terms of background, many of us were academics, although our staff
included another person and myself with organizing experience. Three of our
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board members came from governmental and foundation backgrounds: we
had a preponderance of economists. Intellectually, we were a disparate group
- a few anarchists, a couple who might be classified as liberals moving left, a
couple of Marxists, a couple of strong anti-Marxists and at least a couple who
evaded classification.
We were fortunate in having members who, whatever their background,
had the capacity to work equally well with bankers, workers and government
bureaucrats.This required a pragmatic orientation as well as the practical skills
that many of us developed. Our organization for the most part did not attract
ideologues, who preferred to watch skeptically from the sidelines. To activists,
however, it offered a whole new arena for action, and a number of original
board members have all but moved out of academia to work semipermanently on developing worker management. Part of the attraction lies in
the promise of creating long lasting institutions rather than temporary
organizations. A number found, as I did, that the challenge of developing new
skills and the opportunity to make a difference in people's lives, by creating
jobs which had greater dignity and freedom, was worth considering as a
career.

THE DEMISE OF THE NMSO AND THE RISE OF THE RMSO

It was largely this commitment to long-term work that impelled many of
us to continue despite the demise of our original organization, the NMSO.
Aside from the centripetal force within the organization which made the idea
of a federation with a central staff unworkable, there were cogent, objective
reasons for decentralizing. The experience of working with a number of projects made it clear that extensive staff time was needed for each project. Local
technical assistance was the only answer because it was impossible to expect
staff who lived elsewhere to spend weeks and even months away from home.
Hence, the Steering Committee decided it would be better to disband the central office and allow those staff who so desired to continue working with
specific chapters. Two chapters proceeded to incorporate as independent tax
exempt organizations; the original Ithaca group continued to assist the Ithaca
cooperatives. I joined forces with what had formerly been the Boston chapter.
I had worked closely with its members and identified with their approach of
developing sufficient expertise to work effectively with projects of a significant size.
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In Boston we formed a board and, working with another member, I applied once again for tax exemption. This time, benefiting from the lessons I
had learned before, the application was routine. We told the IRS examiner
what sections of the Code were relevant since it turned out that we knew more
about the case than he did. This time we started with a cohesive board composed
mainly of members who had worked together on other projects. Remembering
the problems of our parent organization, the NSMO, we added to the board
slowly, bringing in potential new members on a probationary basis so that only after considerable acquaintance were they invited or not invited to become
board members. As a result, a cohesiveness was maintained which facilitated
difficult organizational decisions regarding allocation of staff and resources.
It also meant that in several cases it was posssible to quietly drop board
members who did not work well with the group or who did not manifest the expected commitment. Thus came about the RMSO, a regional organization
which mainly restricted the scope of its activities to within driving distance of
Boston.
In doing this, we were following the organizational principles which we
had learned were necessary for worker cooperatives as well. Unlike consumer
cooperatives which maintain the principle of open membership, we had learned
that worker cooperatives involve a far closer and more intensive form of
association. Working members must fit in, and while membership is in principle open to all comers, those who apply must prove their capacity to work effectively with their cohorts, and also to take their share of responsbility for
participating in the control of the organization. The kinds of decisions that our
own board had to make were by no means pro forma ones; they involved
analyses and decisions regarding financial and organizational viability, jobs,
and whether to develop and support funding proposals that often were in the
hundreds of thousands, and occasionally in the millions, of dollars. We needed people with judgment and business experience who had a strong commitment to what we were doing. We also needed people with whom we felt personally comfortable. Our work was pragmatic as well as based on theory. We
needed to be flexible, to be able to learn from our mistakes — which we certainly made — and to learn from each other. Ideologues and a priorists could
easily have destroyed the effectiveness of our board as a working group. Fortunately, we only attracted a few of these and when we did, they found their
views were not shared and so they left.
In the RSMO our problems were mainly external to the organiztion. We
were freed from the internal conflicts that had characterized the NSMO but
this meant that we had to develop a coherent approach to implementing selfmanagement which involved not simply working with projects, but also
creating a climate within city and state government, within relevant federal
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agencies, within local unions and within foundations that would be favorable
to our work. We had inherited two projects from the NSMO — a poultry processing cooperative that was in the process of formation in Connecticut and a
typesetting and bindery cooperative in Massachusetts. In the beginning we had
no paid staff but had two full-time volunteers — one worked with the poultry
cooperative and the other with the typesetting coooperative. A person whose
background included extensive experience in both organizing and professional
fundraising indicated interest in joining the staff. We engaged him and as he
successfully raised funds, we were able to hire additional staff — a business
analyst, a co-coordinator responsible for education and administration, an
economist who had gained business and organizing experience with the NSMO
and an administrator who also had business experience.
In the RSMO we were able to implement a far more collective form of action than had been possible in the NSMO, with its far-flung chapters.
Although we became involved in one project in North Carolina, a cut-and-sew
factory that had come out of the civil rights movement, all of our other projects were within easy reach and board members as well as staff were involved
in one or another of these projects. Our board meetings consisted of experience and information sharing and of tactical discussions of next steps. The
need for formal decisions was relatively rare. We were involved in several projects which used all our resources, both board and staff, and formal decisions
were limited to the selection of new board members and the hiring of new
staff. Our basic strategy was unchanged from the days of the NSMO: we
worked primarily with plants that had been shut down because of mismanagement and in one case bankruptcy, although we also helped a couple of small
new cooperatives start from scratch. Our major concern was to develop an effective track record which could assure us further funding. We realized that we
were involved in a long-term project and that it might be a decade or more
before our work bore real fruit. In order to supplement our foundation funding, we developed a system of charging the worker cooperatives with which we
worked, the payment determined by profitability of the enterprise and capacity
to pay.

THE DANGERS OF GROWTH

As the RSMO grew it became more professionalized. From a voluntaristic organization with no staff and a working board, it became an
organization with a growing staff and less board involvement in project work.
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Board meetings became information sessions where the staff described their
activities to the board and occasionally asked for help or counsel. Board
meetings were changed from biweekly to monthly, then from monthly to
quarterly. We were undergoing a process of informal differentiation which
could lead, as Holleb and Abrams (1975) have shown, from what they call
consensual anarchy to bureaucracy. The notion here is that organizations, as
they develop, encounter certain critical choice-points. If they simply allow the
forces of growth and differentiation to have full play, they can easily end up
with bureaucracy and top-down control. Countering these forces requires a
democratic restructuring to take account of increasing differentiation while at
the same time maintaining control by the members as a whole rather than
allowing the newly developed administrative apparatus to take over.
We faced this issue, but only after we had moved toward a situation
where the board had become an appendage of the staff with little more than
pro forma exercise of power. Dissatisfied with the extent to which we had
become similar in structure to conventional voluntary organizations, we instigated
a structure of two committees which split the decision-making functions of the
organization. The Outreach Committee took care of external relations,
publicity, attracting new board members, and had a personnel committee to
evaluate new staff applications. The Projects Committee was responsible for
all project evaluations and decisions. A final issue was to decide who set the
agenda for the board meetings; this too was resolved as a committee function.
Board members were expected to serve on one or the other of the two committees and, in addition to this, to make some significant contribution to the
organiztion either by working with staff on projects or by developing the
organization in other ways. Although there was still a division between the extent and nature of staff and board members' involvement, the growing split
was contained and rendered manageable. Board members were once again involved in the ongoing work of the organization, while staff members sat on the
board.
One may say that the dangers encountered by the RSMO, as a result of
growth and differentiation, were not the conventional dangers of organizational growth wherein a group of managers become differentiated from the
larger group of workers. In this case it was the staff who had become the
managers while the board became an inactive appendage. However, this form
of regression is characteristic of voluntary organizations which seek to maintain democratic participation. As Holleb and Abrams (1975) point out, the lack
of an appropriate organizational structure and external pressures are factors
tending to precipitate regression.3 In our case, our original structure was informal, pragmatic and without differentiation between staff and board since initially there was no paid staff and later only one person. As the staff grew in
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size they assumed control, partly as a result of the passivity of the non-staff
board members (I count myself among this group) and partly because it was
easier to make decisions among those who worked together on a day-to-day
basis than to make the greater effort of involving the other board members.
However, this tendency was reversed and board members are once more involved in the full decision-making process.

COUNTER-INSTITUTION BUILDING AS A PROFESSION

It has been only recently that I have given any thought to the nature of the
work I have been doing with regard to skills, training and attitude requirements. In part I have been motivated to do so by the recognition of a need
for many more people with similar skills. And in part my interest began when I
realized that a watershed had been reached. Within the last year the RSMO has
become, in a critical sense, professionally competent. After about three years
of working, we have finally come to identify the skills needed to achieve successful implementation of worker management and have developed some successful worker-managed companies. Just as important, we have developed a
successful organization which has passed through a stage of organizational
development and crisis. We are now recognized as one of the leading, if not the
leading, organization in the field of technical assistance to worker management, as witnessed by a commitment on the part of the National Consumer
Cooperative Bank to major funding support.
Most of our work is done in teams of two or more and involves continuing assessments of many aspects of a constantly changing situation. Here we
have learned the wisdom of having several points of view and the value of having imputs from members with specific training in business, organizational
development and organizing. In our own organization, and in the organizations we work with, we have learned the importance of "double loop learning"
(Argyris and Schon, 1974), where not only methods but objectives are
modified and re-evaluated in the light of ongoing experience. Often the situations we work with are fluid and can change rapidly, in part because of the
marginality of the projects we are forced to deal with. Initial plans must
sometimes be totally recast and our own decisions must often be made in consultation with the workers we are trying to help.
It is difficult to describe with any clarity the kind of training needed to
function successfully in the roles described above. Perhaps the least definable
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skill is that of the organizer. There are schools for organizers such as Alinsky's
Industrial Areas Institute or the training program run by ACORN, but in all of
the cases of which I am aware, candidates are chosen on the basis of aptitude.
Personality plays an important role here and there seems to be considerable
agreement that there are certain personality and character requirements for the
successful organizer. This seems equally true for the entrepreneur, and a
technical assistance organization that I know, which is involved in minority
economic development, focuses mainly on locating the type of people capable
of being entrepreneurs. Although the idea seems to conflict with the ideal of
democratic group development of an enterprise, in our work we have learned
that in the initial stages it is important to have a central figure with the
necessary skills and leadership ability who is capable of getting a new project
off the ground. In part this is undoubtedly a product of the split within the corporate system between workers and managers; workers are socialized into attitudes of subordination while managers are accustomed to taking leadership.
Related to organizing skills are organizational development and process
skills — although some organizers are notably lacking in these areas. The ability to teach these skills to the members of worker-managed companies is also
needed. An organizer must not only organize but must teach others how to
organize, how to run meetings and how to achieve consensus. In the RSMO
there is still something of a division between those who have business skills and
those who have process skills. This division is replicated in at least two other
technical assistance organizations which work with cooperatives. It seems to
mirror a cultural division between the world of business, with its primary interest in "hard" skills, and the world of service and alternative organizations
where "soft" skills prevail and there is often a lack of business skills. Some
liberal-minded businesses are now trying to bridge this dichotomy and there is
a growing awareness among alternative organizations of the need for effective
business practice.
The role of management in self-managed systems is a difficult one. Much
more is demanded of a manager in a self-managed enterprise than in a conventional one. On the one hand, his/her authority is limited by the fact that final
authority rests with the members as a whole. On the other hand, she/he must
implement policy decisions in the most effective way possible, but do so in a
consultative fashion which takes account of his/her own subordinate position.
Managers must thus be process-oriented as well as business and goal-oriented.
They must be sensitive to the feelings and needs of other members but also
responsive to the performance demands placed on the organization by external
constraints. On occasion staff from the RSMO have stepped in as temporary
managers. The skills required are much the same and the same tensions between goals and process must be confronted within the RSMO since the ad-
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ministrative staff holds the same position in relation to the board as management holds to its members in a self-managed enterprise.
Development toward successful democratic management involves the
type of "double loop learning" mentioned earlier because, initially, the enterprise is usually highly dependent on the management since the members have
not yet acquired the knowledge nor learned the process and organizational
skills needed to exercise collective authority. As they acquire these skills, the
internal structure of the enterprise is modified as a working board develops
and as members participate more in workplace decisions. Considerable trust is
required for this process to develop. In one worker cooperative that we helped
develop, the manager raised the issue with us of whether he should tell workers
where some new orders were coming from. They were not firm yet and he was
afraid that if he imparted this information, which by right he knew he should,
some new workers w i t h relatives in a competing company might tell them and
the orders might be lost. In the worker-managed factory in Quebec which I
helped develop, the workers so greatly lacked a sense of ownership that they
would steal the factory's tools. In one sense the problem was precisely that it
was we, not the workers, who had organized the factory; the initial work was
ours, and the workers never came to feel that the organization truly belonged
to them.
As our work w i t h the RSMO proceeded, we were able to codify some of
our experience. We now know the appropriate legal structure for an enterprise of a given size, whether in a given case it is better to incorporate under
cooperative or corporate law and how to develop an internal structure which
successfully deals with entry and exit problems, allows for capital accumulation and makes for a sense of individual member commitment. The resolution
of these issues has involved the application of some rather general theory to a
growing body of practice — our own but also that of successful workermanaged systems in other countries. We know how to find a place for a union
in a worker-managed system and we know the stages of development the
system is likely to go through on the way to realization of full member participation. This knowledge has vastly simplified the task of our field workers
and we no longer need to rely so frequently on ad hoc solutions.
Since we now have a complete team to call on — with specialists in
business, organizing, structural issues, and education — we are no longer quite
the generalists we were in the beginning. But evaluations of performance and
of next steps are almost always group evaluations, many of them involving
either a committee of the board or the board as a whole. In this we function
much like the cooperatives which we work to develop. We are involved collectively in policy decisions, and to make them, we seek a synoptic view of our
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projects that is comparable to that taken by the board of directors and top
staff of a conventional corporation. Much of the challenge and excitement of
our work derives from this. We are very much aware that we are a frontier
organization doing pioneer work. At present we are engaged in long-range
strategy discussions about extending the network of contacts that can bring us
information about plant closings and solidifying our contacts with government agencies, especially the National Consumer Cooperative Bank. We are
considering whether to concentrate more intensively on one area so as to be
able to develop a locally intensive system of self-managed enterprises which
can be self-reinforcing, engaging in internal trade relations so as to develop
towards a mini-economy.
We are still involved, however, in many of the dilemmas of marginality.
Although an increasing percentage of our funding comes from consulting fees
and government sources, we are still dependent on relatively short-term foundation funding and, consequently, we need to demonstrate successes. On the
one hand, we cannot afford the relatively long time it takes to develop a new
enterprise from scratch. On the other hand, we cannot afford to reopen enterprises and then see them fail. A disproportionate amount of resources has
been spent to prop-up enterprises which we helped develop when we lacked the
skills we now have. These enterprises have remained marginal, surviving only
with the help of continuing injections of further funding and technical
assistance. We are more selective now about whom we choose to work with
since it is of no service to the workers to burden them with a cooperative that
cannot succeed.

CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is too early to make any definitive evaluation of an experiment that has
lasted for only six years. Economic democracy and worker management are
now becoming more acceptable. The events at Youngstown, Ohio, where a
coalition of workers and the community attempted to buy out a large steel
company which was shutting down, the acceptance of Douglas Frazer, the
President of the United Auto Workers, as a Chrysler Corporation Board
member and the publicity given to plant closings all over the country have all
made worker ownership and worker management more acceptable. A book
has appeared, co-authored by a board member of the National Consumer
Cooperative Bank, outlining a political strategy for the eighties and beyond
that focusing on the achievement of economic democracy (Carnoy and
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Shearer, 1980). But none of this has made the task of developing workermanaged enterprises any easier. The strategy which we adopted six years ago
and have adhered to since has been only marginally successful. We have
developed three cooperatives which by industrial standards are tiny — the
largest has eighty workers. We have given technical assistance to a number of
even smaller enterprises and to a worker/community-owned supermarket.
One of our first cooperatives has gone bankrupt — a victim of market
takeover by large corporations.
Our strategy of giving technical assistance to worker takeovers has placed
us at one remove from the actual responsiblity of operating these companies.
We have come to realize that there is a lack of people with the qualifications to
organize worker-managed companies and that if such people were around, our
own work would become much easier. As a response to this, two board
members of the RMSO and one former board member of the NMSO have set
up separate training programs in worker management. (1 am the coordinator
of one such program, the only one on the undergraduate level.) All three programs are multi-disciplinary, with a strong practical component of field work.
We hope that from these programs will come the future advocates and practitioners of worker management. However, probably only a minority of these
graduates will have the motivation, skills and character type that will make
them the entrepreneurs and organizers of future worker-managed enterprises.
Only a minority will be motivated to bridge the cultural gap between "hard"
skills and "soft" skills so as to combine both in their work.
There seem to be promising alternative strategies to the one on which we
have relied. During the six years we have been operating, a number of companies
in growth industries have developed from one-person basement operations into multi-million dollar enterprises employing hundreds and selling nationally.
We are now beginning to t h i n k about planned start-ups where the industry,
product and market are all selected according to both social and economic
criteria. We are concerned that isolated enterprises existing within a culture
based on fundamentally different organizational and axiological assumptions
are susceptible to degeneration to the standard form. This holds true either
under conditions of marginality and failure or of significant success, and there
are examples of this sort of degeneration resulting from both conditions. In
the case of failure, worker-managed firms have doubted their own structure
and managerial capacity and have called in outside management. In the case of
success, the lure of large profits has caused some of the West Coast plywood
cooperatives to sell out to conglomerates (Bernstein, 1974).
There is the example in Northern Spain, in the Basque region, of a large
system of worker cooperatives, combined with agricultural, fishery, housing
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and consumer cooperatives, which directly employs about 30,000 people and
which continues to grow and flourish (Campbell, et al., 1977). Through a division of the Caja Lavoral, its cooperative bank, it develops, by plan, four new
cooperatives a year, employing around 400 working members. Through a
social security cooperative it provides 100 percent disability, health care and
retirement benefits for all its members. Through its technical college it trains
several thousand workers in technical skills and the principles of worker
management. In its twenty-year history, it has never had a failure — a tribute
to the system's careful planning and thorough research by the Caja Lavoral in
the selection of management, products and markets. This serves as a model of
what can be done and how to do it. Vanek (1977) and others (e.g., Ellerman,
1979), before they knew about this system, had arrived at a theoretical critique
of the shortcomings of traditional cooperative structure which led in the same
direction as the structure developed by the Mondragon system in Northern
Spain.
The intellectual nexus of the theory of worker management lies on the interface between the individual and the formal organiztion and thus, between
psychology and organization theory (Benello, 1980). Legal theory, especially
property theory (Ellerman, 1978), economic theory (Ward, 1958; Vanek,
1971), and political theory (Burns, Karlsson, & Rus, 1979) as well as administration theory (Dunn, 1976; Garson, 1975) are also involved. 4 On the
more practical side, business, finance and management disciplines are required. The normative considerations which lead to the idea of freedom and
self-determination in work derive from ethics, politics and the psychology of
development (Benello, 1978). From the perspective of counter-institution
building, the accepted divisions within social science have little meaning as a
spectrum of specific skills, theory and knowledge in a variety of fields are involved. The detachment of the scientific observer is necessary in evaluating
both specific outcomes and broad strategy; commitment of a normative ideal
is necessary in order to effect change. The lesson is the need for holism in approaching social science.

NOTES

1.
2.
3.

George Benello is an Adjunct Professor of Sociology at Hampshire College and Coordinator
of the Project on Work and Democracy, a five college consortium project.
This was mentioned in a seminar given at Hampshire College, Winter of 1979-80.
1 owe some references (to Argyris and Schon and to Holleb and Abrams) to conversations
with Grant Ingle. His Ph.D. thesis. "Keeping Alternative Institutions Alternative" (unpublished) is the best analysis I have seen of the dangers encountered by alternative democratic institutions and how to deal with them.
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Dunn (1976) argues that the greatest opening toward democratization lies in public administration organizations, not private sector organizations. But little or no publicity has accompanied these developments and while they may be more open to such developments, they
make little impact on the public at large.
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